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ABSTRACT: This paper examines the impact of urban sprawl, a phenomenon of particular 
interest in Spain, which is currently experiencing this process of rapid, low-density urban 
expansion. Many adverse consequences are attributed to urban sprawl (e.g., traffic congestion, 
air pollution and social segregation), though here we are concerned primarily with the rising 
costs of providing local public services. Our initial aim is to develop an accurate measure of 
urban sprawl so that we might empirically test its impact on municipal budgets. Then, we 
undertake an empirical analysis using a cross-sectional data set of 2,500 Spanish municipalities 
for the year 2003 and a piecewise linear function to account for the potentially nonlinear 
relationship between sprawl and local costs. The estimations derived from the expenditure 
equations for both aggregate and six disaggregated spending categories indicate that low-density 
development patterns lead to greater provision costs of local public services. 
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RESUMEN: En el presente trabajo se analiza el impacto de la dispersión urbana, un fenómeno 
de especial interés en España, donde destaca la rapidez con la que este proceso de desarrollo 
urbano de baja densidad esta teniendo lugar actualmente. A pesar de la diversidad de 
consecuencias atribuidas a la dispersión urbana (tales como congestión del tráfico, 
contaminación o segregación social), aquí nos centramos en analizar el incremento en el coste 
de provisión de los servicios públicos locales. Con este objetivo, en primer lugar definimos una 
medida precisa de dispersión urbana que nos permita analizar empíricamente su impacto sobre 
los presupuestos municipales. En segundo lugar, llevamos a cabo un análisis empírico con datos 
de corte transversal para 2.500 municipios españoles referidos al año 2003 y una función lineal 
por tramos que recoge la posible relación no lineal existente entre la dispersión urbana y los 
costes. Las estimaciones obtenidas para las ecuaciones de gasto tanto a nivel agregado como 
para las seis categorías de gasto consideradas muestran que los desarrollos urbanos de baja 
densidad incrementan el coste de provisión de los servicios públicos locales. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years Europe has been involved in a far-reaching process of land use change. Its 
former compact, vertical pattern of urban growth has been replaced by a horizontal pattern, 
characterized by a rapid, low-density outward expansion, known as urban sprawl. This new 
urban development model, exclusive to U.S. cities since the beginning of the 20th century, has 
now become part of the European landscape. A recent report published by the European 
Environment Agency (EEA, 2006) asserts that the urbanized land consumed per person during 
the last 20 years has more than doubled. Specifically, during this period the extent of built-up 
areas has increased by 20%, while the population has grown by only 6%. Besides, as available 
data show, the situation acquires particular importance in the southern regions of the continent, 
with Spain being no exception. According to data provided by the aerial photographs of the 
Corine Land Cover project (Ministerio de Fomento, 2006), between 1987 and 2000 Spain’s 
artificial land area grew by 29.5%, roughly one third of its overall historical record. Similarly, 
data from the Spanish Property Assessment Office reveal that developed land increased by an 
additional 11.5% during the period 2000-2004. Moreover, most of this development took the 
form of low density urban growth (up by 30% during the 1987-2000 period) and scattered 
growth (up by 26%), while the area undergoing compact development increased by a meagre 
4.1%1. 
 
Urban sprawl has thus become a matter for concern, not only because of the intensity of the 
process but also because of its great environmental, social and economic impact. An increase in 
commuting due to the more scattered nature of urban areas also exacerbates traffic congestion 
and, in turn, air pollution (Sierra Club, 1998; Brueckner 2001; Glaeser and Khan, 2003). 
Excessive land conversion to urban use diminishes the extent of farmland and forests, which 
represents a loss of the amenity benefits from open space (Sierra Club, 1998). The claim is also 
made that urban sprawl reduces social interaction and contributes to socioeconomic segregation 
between the rich of the suburbs and the poor of the inner cities (Downs, 1999; Brueckner, 2000, 
2001; Glaeser and Khan, 2003). Then, several poverty-related problems arise in low-income 
neighbourhoods, such as increasing crime rates, poor-quality public services and lack of fiscal 
resources. However, among the many consequences already mentioned the impact on municipal 
finances is perhaps the most relevant. Although many factors have an influence on the amount, 
allocation and distribution of local public spending, there is a growing conviction that urban 
spatial structure is gaining in importance. Low-density expansion increases the costs of 
providing local public services. Major investments are required to extend the highway network, 
                                                     
1 The area devoted to transport infrastructure and to industrial and commercial uses also increased 
considerably during the period: 150 and 60%, respectively (Ministerio de Fomento, 2006). 
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and water, electricity or sewer lines to a relatively small number of residents (see., e.g., 
Carruthers, 2002). Likewise, as a result of the greater dispersion of population in the 
municipality, such districts fail to capitalize on economies of scale and optimise on facility 
location of several public services, including public education, police protection or public 
transportation (Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2006). 
 
Thus, the aim of this paper is to determine empirically the impact of urban sprawl on the costs 
of providing local public services. Specifically, we estimate a per capita local public spending 
equation both for aggregate spending and for six disaggregated spending categories that 
intuitively should be more markedly influenced by urban sprawl: Community Facilities, Basic 
Infrastructures and Transport, Local Police, Culture and Sports, Housing and Community 
Development and General Administration. Four variables are introduced in measuring urban 
sprawl. The main one is a measure of density, defined as the urbanized land per person. This 
variable is measured at the municipal level, i.e. where the policy decisions concerning the above 
spending functions are taken. Note that this variable represents an improvement on that adopted 
in previous empirical analyses. First, the data available for Spain allow us to use the urbanized 
or developed area instead of the developable land area or even the total land area of the 
municipality2 and, second, we are able to employ a more highly disaggregated spatial unit of 
analysis than that used in previous studies, which had to work with data at the county level (see 
Ladd 1992, 1994; Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2002, 2003). Besides, so as to capture the 
relationship between this variable and the dependent variable more accurately, we use a highly 
flexible approach that allows our data to determine this functional form. The number of 
population centres and the number of residential housing units per capita, as well as the 
percentage of scattered population are additionally included in the model as sprawl measures. 
Further, we also introduce a number of control variables in the expenditure function so as to 
take into account the effect of different potential users, other cost factors and fiscal capacity on 
expenditure. Having controlled for these effects, we are then in a position to identify the specific 
impact of urban sprawl on local costs. In other words, we can determine whether among 
municipalities with the same characteristics the more sprawled ones have to deal with extra 
costs in providing certain local services.  
 
While much has been written about the causes of urban sprawl, little attention has been paid to 
its implications, especially to its impact on local budgets. Empirical evidence regarding the 
fiscal consequences of sprawl is scarce and remains inconclusive (see Ladd, 1992, 1994; 
                                                     
2 Developable land is defined as the total amount of land that is legally recognized as having been 
developed or which is available for development in each municipality. As such it includes both the built-
up and the non built-up areas that are nevertheless available for construction purposes. 
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Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2006). Therefore, the present study seeks to extend the empirical 
literature that examines the costs of urban development of this nature. Further, this is a 
relatively new study for the Spanish case, since the literature to date has largely focused on the 
American case and previous analyses conducted in Spain have not examined the effects of 
sprawl directly. Existing economic studies investigate the determinants of total and current local 
public spending in Spain (see Solé-Ollé and Bosch, 2005), and include a measure of sprawl as 
one of its control variables. Solé-Ollé (2001) uses more highly disaggregated measures of 
spending, but focuses only on the province of Barcelona. Therefore, the present study seeks to 
provide a more accurate measure of sprawl, as well as undertaking an analysis not only of total 
and current spending but also of several disaggregated expenditure functions for all of Spain’s 
municipalities. Should our results suggest that urban sprawl is more expensive to maintain than 
a more compact development, this would then be a starting point for discussing the role that 
local and regional governments should play in regulating the outcome of this pattern of growth. 
In this sense, the increasing provision costs of public goods and services, as well as additional 
consequences related to urban sprawl, have been used by critics of this phenomenon to justify 
the use of growth control programs and cooperation policies among jurisdictions that promote 
more compact urban areas (Katz, 2002; Carruthers, 2002; Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2003). 
 
The article is organized as follows. In the next section we provide a brief overview of previous 
theoretical studies that have examined the causes and consequences of urban sprawl as well as 
the existing empirical studies that have analysed the impact of such sprawl on the costs of 
providing local public services. In the third section we explain the methodology and the data 
used in carrying out our empirical analysis, and we discuss the main results. Finally, in the last 
section, we conclude. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Several benefits have been attributed to urban sprawl in terms of the fulfilment of residents’ 
preferences for larger, single-family detached housing, greater proximity to open spaces, and 
segregation from some of the problems suffered by the inner city such as pollution, crime and 
congestion. Nonetheless, these benefits can be offset by a wide variety of social costs, including 
traffic congestion, air pollution and social segregation3. In addition to these negative 
                                                     
3 For a further review of the main consequences of urban sprawl, see Mieszkowski and Mills (1993), 
Brueckner (2000, 2001 and 2001b), Brueckner and Kim (2003), Song and Zenou (2006), Carruthers 
(2002), Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2002), Glaeser and Khan (2003), McGuire and Sjoquist (2002). 
Besides, Gordon and Richardson (1997), Downs (1998, 1999), Burchell et al (2002), Glaeser and Khan 
(2003), Nechyba and Walsh (2004), Brueckner (2000, 2001), Brueckner and Largey (2006), Sierra Club 
(1998), Khan (2000) and Henderson and Mitra (1996), among others, also offer an explanation of the 
many factors that might be considered the driving force behind this phenomenon. 
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consequences, there is one economic impact which is of particular concern: the impact of urban 
sprawl on the cost-effective provision of local public services. When a city expands, its 
infrastructure together with certain public goods and services need to be increased to maintain a 
given level of public services for all its residents. Consequently, suburbanization leads to a 
marked increase in the provision costs of local public services, such as trash collection, police 
and fire protection, public transport and road cleaning services. In such cases, the lower density 
of individual consumers undermines economies of scale in the provision of public services, 
resulting in inefficient cost increases (Elis-Williams, 1987; McGuire and Sjoquist, 2002; 
Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2003). Consider for instance two municipalities with the same 
characteristics (in terms of both size and population) but different densities. In the less dense of 
the two, there will be a need for more garbage trucks or, alternatively, the trucks available will 
have to cover longer routes in order to provide the same quality of trash collection to all its 
residents. Trash collection costs, as well as road cleaning or police protection costs, vary 
directly with distance. Therefore, the provision of such services is more expensive in less dense 
municipalities. Spatially expansive development patterns also lead to greater costs because of 
the larger investments required in extending basic infrastructure (roadways, sewerage, 
electricity) over greater distances to reach relatively fewer numbers of residents (Carruthers, 
2002).  
 
The empirical literature that examines the impact of urban sprawl on the provision costs of local 
public services and on local budgets in general is relatively scarce and focuses primarily on U.S. 
cities. This research, moreover, does not always lead to the same conclusions and so we can 
make no claims as to the presence of a causal relationship between urban sprawl and the 
provision costs of certain public goods and services. In fact, this relationship remains 
ambiguous and controversial4. 
 
Several studies have analysed the effect of different development patterns (urban sprawl versus 
compact development) on the provision costs of public services using cost simulation models 
(see Burchell and Mukherji, 2003; Speir and Stephenson, 2002). Other studies have adopted an 
alternative approach based on econometric techniques in order to analyse the relationship 
between per capita local spending and various density measures, while controlling for other 
                                                     
4 Note that part of this ambiguity is due to a lack of a consensus in the accepted definition of sprawl 
(Ewing, 1997; McGuire and Sjoquist, 2002; Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2003; Muñiz et al, 2006). Thus, 
sometimes it is defined as a cause of an externality (Sierra Club, 1998, 2000; Downs, 1999), as the 
consequence of particular land use practices (Downs, 1998, 1999; Burchell et al, 1998; Ewing 1997; 
Glaeser and Khan (2003) or it is associated with different patterns of development (Nelson et al, 1999; 
Pendall, 1999). However, as noted in Galster et al (2001), a clearer conceptual and operational definition 
would be useful for research purposes. If sprawl is a concept that describes a process that occurs within an 
urban area, it should include objective conditions based on the morphology of the landscape, which 
should enable it to be measured empirically (Muñiz et al, 2006). 
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public spending determinants (see Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2003, 2006). All of these studies 
provide evidence of the positive impact of urban sprawl on the provision costs of certain local 
public services. However, we also find contradictory findings regarding the impact of urban 
sprawl on local public finance (Ladd and Yinger, 1989; Ladd 1992, 1994). These authors find 
that costs rise with high densities, and they attribute this result to social factors, as poverty or 
crime. But this means that once the researcher has appropriately controlled for these 
environmental factors, the results should say that sprawl raises costs. This also suggest therefore 
that both views might be correct, the relationship between sprawl and costs being possibly non-
linear. The approach followed will take this into account. Finally, empirical studies conducted 
in Spain, in common with the studies cited above, do not analyse urban sprawl directly, but 
rather their main objective is to analyse the determinants of local public spending. However, 
they do provide some indirect evidence as their demand functions include explanatory variables 
that proxy urban sprawl (see Solé-Ollé, 2001 and Solé-Ollé and Bosch, 2005).  
 
Given that the empirical evidence available remains poor and, to some extent, controversial, we 
believe a study of the Spanish case makes an interesting complement to the existing literature. 
In the section that follows we outline the methodology used in carrying out our study and 
describe the variables included in the model and the sources used in constructing them. 
 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.1 The model 
 
The analysis proposed here requires the estimation of a very similar demand model to that 
commonly used in the extensive literature on local public spending. This enables us to separate 
the effects of urban sprawl on local costs from those of other factors5. In such models, the 
desired level of per capita spending is specified as a function of the demand for public services 
and their provision costs. Therefore, the estimated expenditure function results from combining 
a cost and a demand model. Below, and in line with the research developed by Borcheding and 
Deacon (1972), we specify the empirical model used in analysing the determinants of local 
public spending. 
 
The cost model. The starting point is the cost model, where the outcome of local public services 
(q), understood as a measure of the quantity/quality of services enjoyed by the citizen, depends 
                                                     
5 Ladd (1992, 1994), Solé-Ollé (2001) and Solé-Ollé and Bosch (2005), for example, adopt this 
methodology. 
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on the level of output or activity performed by the government (o), urban sprawl (d) and a group 
of environmental cost factors (z):  
 
 
)()( zhdf
oq ⋅=  (1) 
 
In the case of the production technology of local public services, we assume that the output (o) 
is produced under constant returns to scale, so that the cost function to produce this output, 
given an input costs index (w), and an indicator that captures the level of responsibilities of each 
municipality (s) (see Dependent variables in Section 3.2. for an explanation), can be expressed 
as: 
 
 swoswoC ⋅⋅=),,(  (2) 
 
Obtaining o from equation (1) and substituting it in (2), the output cost function (C(o,w,s)) can 
be transformed in an outcome cost function, C(q,d,z,w,s): 
 
 swzhdfqC ⋅⋅⋅⋅= )()(  (3) 
 
In order to estimate this cost function we need data on the outcome of local public services (q). 
Given that these data are not generally available, an alternative involves combining this cost 
model with a demand model. In so doing, we are able to obtain an expression without the 
outcome variable and, as such, it can be easily estimated. 
 
The demand model. We start from an outcome demand function of public services, where the 
residents’ desired level of outcome is negatively correlated with their share of the marginal 
provision cost, and positively correlated with the given resource level and their preferences. 
 
To combine the cost model with the demand model, we use a theoretical model that describes 
the decision-making process of local governments. Although there is no agreement as to which 
model is best, the most commonly used in the literature is the model based on the median voter 
theorem (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973). Unfortunately, we are unable to identify the median 
voter empirically, so we assume that the aim of the local government is to maximize the utility 
of a representative voter, given by the following expression: 
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where Ur is the utility function of the representative voter, which depends on the consumption 
of the private good (xr), the public good outcome (q) and their preferences (vr). Three 
constraints are imposed on this representative voter: first, a budgetary constraint, where t is the 
tax rate, br the voter’s tax base and yr his level of income; second, a local government budgetary 
constraint, where B is the total tax base of the jurisdiction and G the total amount of transfers 
received by the local government; and, finally, an outcome cost function (explained above in 
equation 3). The combination of these three constraints yields the following expression: 
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The mean tax base per head is given by b = B/N, and transfers received per head by g = G/N. So 
the right-hand side of expression (5) measures the overall income of the representative voter. 
Besides, br/b indicates the influence of the tax system on the representative voter’s choice (tax 
share). 
 
The fist order condition obtained by maximizing the utility function, subject to the constraint 
given in equation (5) is: 
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where pr denotes the tax price, which is defined as the product of the marginal cost of q (∂C/∂q) 
and the tax share (br/b). 
 
In order to adapt this model to an easily estimable framework, we assume that the demand 
function is log-linear: 
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Equation (7) indicates that the level of outcome depends on the tax price, on the level of income 
of the representative voter and on his preferences. Substituting (6) in (7) and the result in (3), we 
obtain the per capita expenditure function: 
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Finally, taking logs we obtain the estimable spending equation: 
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Therefore, per capita local spending depends, on the one hand, on a group of cost factors: urban 
development patterns, other environmental cost factors (such as population or potential users, 
among others), input costs and responsibilities. On the other hand, per capita local spending is a 
function of three demand factors: income, tax share and transfers received and preferences. 
 
Note that estimated parameters cannot be interpreted in terms of their direct effect on the costs 
of providing public services, since the price elasticity of demand (parameter α) is involved in 
the specification. Cost variables increase service costs and, as a consequence, this reduces the 
demand for these services. Despite this, and thanks to the log-linear form assumed, it is possible 
to obtain the direct effect on costs by simply dividing the coefficients of the cost variables by 
(α+1) (Solé-Ollé and Bosch, 2005). 
 
3.2 Data 
 
We estimate equation (9) by employing a cross-sectional data set of the Spanish municipalities, 
the structure of which can be described briefly as follows. First, local governments have similar 
spending responsibilities to those in other countries (i.e. basic infrastructures, social promotion, 
public safety, community facilities or housing) with the exception of education, which 
corresponds to regional governments (see the Section on Dependent Variables below for a 
further explanation of the responsibilities structure). Second, there is a high degree of local 
fragmentation, since 90% of the approximately 8,100 existing municipalities have fewer than 
5,000 inhabitants and represent just 5% of the total population. Finally, the services provided at 
the local level are financed mainly out of taxes (including the property tax, the local business 
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tax and the local motor vehicle tax) and unconditional grants (roughly one third of current 
revenues). 
 
Thus, the model given by equation (9) is estimated using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 
Spanish municipalities for the year 2003. Data availability has, however, forced us to reduce the 
size of our data set. Specifically, data regarding several explanatory variables are not available 
for municipalities with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants. Hence, our data set includes almost all the 
municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants. This we believe to be sufficiently 
representative given that they account for about 85% of the total population. Additionally, the 
year of study was not randomly selected but rather determined by the availability of budgetary 
data disaggregated by functions and sub-functions. Table 1 provides the definition, source and 
descriptive statistics of all the variables included in the analysis. 
 
Urban sprawl variables. First, we shall focus on the main variables included in this study, 
which are those related to urban development patterns. In line with previous studies, we 
consider urban sprawl to be a low-density growth pattern characterized by the excessive and 
discontinuous spatial expansion of urban land. However, measuring this phenomenon remains 
somewhat elusive, with the vast majority of studies employing variants of population density to 
proxy urban sprawl. But, there is no agreement regarding the right specification for its 
measurement or its appropriateness as a sprawl measure. First, there is no consensus as to the 
most suitable variable for capturing density (density of housing units, population or 
employment), the extent of space over which density should be characterized (total or urbanized 
area) and the scale at which density should be measured (metropolitan area, municipality or 
neighbourhood) (see Gordon and Richardson, 1997 and Torrens and Alberti, 2000 for a fuller 
explanation). Second, as noted in Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2003), density is only part of the 
picture and, on occasions, it provides a somewhat ambiguous image of the urban form, telling 
us little about the distribution of residential uses (Galster et al, 2001). Even so, density is the 
most widely used indicator of sprawl because of its simplicity (Elis-Williams, 1987) and the 
difficulty of obtaining data for alternative measures (Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2003). 
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Table 1. Definition of the variables, Descriptive Statistics and Sources 
Definition Mean St. Deviation Sources 
     
Total spending  782.38 381.59 
Current spending 516.75 219.36 
Local police  27.63 32.35 
Basic infrastructures and transportation  92.31 125.01 
Spanish Ministry of Finance 
(Liquidación de Presupuestos de las 
Entidades Locales, 2003) 
Community facilities  79.97 69.16  
Housing and community development  123.6 133.76  
Culture and Sports 115.21 102.35  
General administration  127.98 104.71  
Current grants 223.67 99.005  
Capital grants 130.28 150.92  
Urbanized land 261.94 365.04 
Residential houses 0.5371 0.2417 
        
Property Assessment Office (Catastro 
Inmobiliario Urbano. Estadísticas 
básicas por municipios y de parcelas 
urbanas, 2003) 
% Scattered population 0.0651 0.1321 
Population centres 0.002 0.0037 
Nomenclátor (National Statistics 
Institute, 2003) 
Population 14583.3 79598.2 
% Immigrants 0.0592 0.0663 
% Population < 5 0.0452 0.0138 
% Population 5-19 0.1582 0.0311 
% Population > 65 0.2028 0.0731 
% Without studies 0.1454 0.0929 
% Graduates 0.0694 0.0392 
% Unemployed 0.1467 0.1016 
% Old houses (built before 1950) 0.2471 0.1683 
% Second houses 0.1805 0.1549 
Census of Population and Housing 
(National Statistics Institute, 2001) 
  
Tourists (Tourist index / population) 119.719 455.001 Anuario Económico “La Caixa” 
Wage 25440.18 2708.62 
Spanish Regional Accounts and 
Quarterly Survey of the Labour Market 
(National Statistics Office, 2003) 
Central city  0.0231 0.2438 
Urban area  101.85 289.59 Own elaboration 
Income 8887.76 1744.43  
Tax Share 0.6666 0.2212 
        
Property Assessment Office, National 
Statistics Office, Spanish Ministry of 
Finance, and Anuario Económico “La 
Caixa” 
Notes: Budgetary variables, wages and income measured in euros; urbanized land measured in square metres. 
Budgetary variables, urbanized land, residential housing, population centres and income in per capita terms. 
 
 
 
11
One of the most common quantifiers is population density itself (Ladd and Yinger, 1989; Ladd, 
1992), and this can be combined with alternative measures of sprawl (see Carruthers and 
Ulfarsson 2002, 2003, 2006; Glaeser and Khan, 2003), so as to provide a more realistic profile 
of the nature of the urban development. More recently, a number of researchers, aware that 
existing databases are not suitable for studying the scattered nature of development, have sought 
to develop more sophisticated methods (see Burchfield et al, 2006). This latest approach is 
without doubt of great potential, but unfortunately the data available for the Spanish case 
prevent us from implementing it. Thus, in the present study we employ a density variable, 
urbanized land, in per capita terms and measured at the municipal level. 
 
Given that little is known about the exact nature of the relationship between this variable and 
the costs of providing public services, we adopt a highly flexible approach that allows the data 
to determine the functional form. Using a piecewise linear function (Ladd 1992), the 
relationship between per capita urbanized land and local costs, while controlling for other 
variables, is estimated as a series of linear connected segments (see Figure 1). The estimated 
coefficients, labelled β1 to β4 in the corresponding figure, indicate the slope of each segment. 
With a sufficiently large sample, this technique leads to a close approximation of the true 
functional form. In order to determine the length of each segment (labelled d1 to d3), various 
strategies might be used. In the present study we adopt the method employed by Dahlberg et al. 
(2006). First, we estimate equation (9) when including the urban sprawl variable (urbanized 
land). The relationship between per capita urbanized land and per capita current spending, both 
variables expressed in logs, is shown in Graph A of Figure 2. From the figure it seems that there 
is a positive and non-linear relationship between both variables in all segments but the first. 
Next, we estimate equation (9) leaving out the urban sprawl variable. If we have correctly 
controlled for the other explanatory variables, the remaining residual impact should illustrate the 
effect of the sprawl variable on the local costs. The relationship between the remaining residuals 
from equation (9) and the per capita urbanized land is presented in Graph B of Figure 26. In 
general, the graphical analysis suggests a very similar performance. The vast majority of the 
observations are concentrated in the middle of the diagram, showing a positive relationship 
between the two variables, while at the extremes of the diagram there are few observations that 
present any great variability. Thus, two points of inflection can also be identified where the 
slope of the adjustment line changes (labelled here with the first and third vertical dotted lines). 
Given the size of the middle segment (which includes the majority of the observations in the 
sample), we chose to divide it in two (second dotted line). Thus, the per capita urbanized land is 
                                                     
6 We conducted the same analysis for total spending and the four disaggregated spending functions. The 
graphs obtained show a very similar functional form. For reasons of space, these graphs are not included 
here. 
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divided in four segments: less than 75 m2/pop (urbanized land_1), between 75 and 160 
(urbanized land_2), between 160 and 700 m2/pop (urbanized land_3) and more than 700 m2/pop 
(urbanized land_4)7.  
 
 
Figure 1. Piecewise linear function 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Scatter diagrams  
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7 The first segment includes 9% of the municipalities in the sample, the second 40%, the third 45% and 
the last 6%. 
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Although density may help to create scale economies for certain public services, it does not, as 
mentioned above, unilaterally describe the character of urban areas. For example, the spatial 
extent of the provision area is determinant for many services, since their cost of delivery varies 
with distance. So, in order to provide a more accurate measurement of the dimension of sprawl, 
taking into account its spatial dimension, we included additional sprawl variables in the model. 
Specifically, we added three variables: residential houses, % of scattered population and 
number of population centres8, all measured in per capita terms. Their inclusion is justified on 
the following grounds. Suppose that only urbanized land is included in the model as a sprawl 
variable. Obviously, given two municipalities with the same population (both in terms of size 
and characteristics), the residents in the one with the most per capita urbanized land will live in 
the larger homes. However, little can be said about their spatial distribution, i.e., about the 
physical form of development. As is shown in Figure 3, a municipality with two apartment 
buildings (municipality A) and a municipality with six single-family houses (municipality B) 
will both have the same per capita urbanized land. 
 
Figure 3. 
Compact urban pattern vs. Urban sprawl pattern 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So, given that per capita urbanized land does not capture the full extent of urban sprawl, we 
included the additional measures of sprawl described above. In this way, the number of 
residential houses identifies whether houses or apartment blocks are the prevalent buildings in 
the municipality. A predominance of single-family houses, combined with a greater per capita 
urbanized land will be related to a low-density and spatially expansive urban pattern, associated 
with a higher level of land consumption. Further, the % of scattered population and population 
centres will determine the extent to which urban growth is scattered and discontinuous.  
                                                     
8 The National Statistics Institute defines population centre as a group of at least ten buildings which form 
streets, squares and other urban roads. Hence, scattered population refers to those people who live in 
buildings not included within this concept of a population centre. 
Municipality A. Compact urban 
pattern 
Municipality B. Urban sprawl 
pattern 
Note: the grey area indicates the total land area of the 
municipality, while the white area denotes urbanized land.
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Dependent variables. As explained above, the Spanish municipal sector is characterized by a 
high degree of fragmentation, with an extremely large number of municipalities with very small 
populations, resources and management capacity. Therefore, the responsibilities assumed by 
local governments are distributed according to the size of their populations, as is established by 
basic law. Specifically, public provision is compulsory for all municipalities in services such as 
trash collection, street cleaning services, water supply, sewer system and street lighting, among 
others. Municipalities with a population greater than 5,000 inhabitants, additionally, have to 
provide parks, public libraries, and solid waste treatment. Municipalities with a population 
greater than 20,000 have to provide local police and social services. Finally, municipalities with 
a population higher than 50,000 inhabitants also have to provide public transport and 
environmental protection. Further, the law provides that local governments can offer additional 
services to those cited above, as well as complementing the services provided by other levels of 
government, in areas such as education, culture, housing, health and environmental protection, 
in order to satisfy the demands of their residents. 
 
In the present study we focus on those local competences that we consider to be most directly 
influenced by a low-density and spatially expansive urban development pattern: infrastructures 
and other facilities (such as sewerage, water supply or street paving and lighting, cultural and 
sports facilities, public parks), and certain local services (police protection, street cleaning, trash 
collection). In so doing, we analyse the six expenditure functions of the municipal budget that 
include these competences (Basic infrastructure and transportation, Community facilities, Local 
police, Housing and community development, Culture and sports, and General administration), 
which represent about 70% of total local spending9, as well as total (Total) and current local 
spending (Current). In all cases, spending is measured in per capita terms. Unfortunately, the 
expenditure functions we consider do not correspond exactly with those analysed in previous 
studies, primarily in the U.S. (see Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2003, 2006). The reason for this is 
that the structure of the municipal sector in Spain differs from that in the U.S. The two systems 
do not share the same municipal competences nor do they have the same expenditure 
composition in terms of the proportion each function represents in terms of total spending. For 
instance, U.S. empirical studies analyse education, which is perhaps the most important part of 
U.S. local spending, while in Spain it is not a sole municipal responsibility. Besides, spending 
on local police is lower in the Spanish case, unlike spending on housing, which is higher.  
                                                     
9 The structure of the Spanish municipal budget in 2003 was as follows (percentage of total spending in 
parentheses): Public Debt (6.6%), General Services (13.2%), Local Police and Public Safety (7.2%), 
Social Promotion and Protection (10.35%), Economic Regulation (4.7%), Transfers to Public 
Administration (0.7%), Basic Infrastructures, Transport and Communication (9%) and Production of 
Social Public Goods (48.15%). This last function includes Health (1.13%), Educational Services (4.1), 
Housing (17.33%), Community Facilities (12.2%) and Culture (11.61%). 
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Control variables. Returning to equation (9), local public spending depends on both cost and 
demand factors. The first group of cost factors is related, as outlined above, to the urban 
development pattern. Additionally, we can identify cost factors other than urban sprawl, such as 
population, responsibilities, harshness of the environment, spillovers and input costs. In order to 
account for the effect of these cost factors, we include three groups of control variables in the 
model (demographic, social and economic cost variables). Finally, four fiscal capacity 
indicators account for the effect of resources on the demand for local public services10. 
 
First, we briefly describe the demographic cost variables. Generally, in previous studies 
population has been introduced as the only demographic cost factor –it being identified with the 
potential service users. Here, we consider an alternative approach that places resident population 
in one of several groups, in which they are considered as potential users presenting special 
needs (Solé-Ollé, 2001). Thus, we include the following variables: total population 
(population), the share of the population below the age of five (% population<5), between five 
and nineteen years old (% population 5-19) and older than sixty-five (% population>65), as 
well as the shares of the population without studies (% without studies) and those that have 
graduated (% graduated). In principle, we would expect the coefficients of these variables to be 
positive, so that the greater the number of potential users presenting special needs, the greater 
the local costs should be. Additionally, as previously mentioned, in Spain the level of 
responsibilities of each municipality varies with population size11. Consequently, the more 
responsibilities the municipality assumes, the higher the local public spending should be12. To 
account for this effect we add three dummies representing the different levels of responsibility 
(responsibility_1, responsibility_2, responsibility_3)13. These variables equal 1 if a municipality 
has more than 5,000, 20,000 or 50,000 inhabitants, respectively. 
 
                                                     
10 Given that these control variables are not the main objective of this present study, they are discussed 
here only in brief. See Ladd and Yinger (1989), Ladd (1992) and Solé-Ollé (2001) for a review of 
arguments that justify their inclusion in the local spending model. 
 
11 See the previous section on Dependent Variables for a more detailed explanation. 
 
12 However, many local governments tend to provide services even without any established official 
responsibility, but rather in response to residents’ demands. Thus, the relationship between the level of 
responsibility and local spending might not be as evident as it might at first seem (Solé-Ollé and Bosch, 
2005).  
 
13 These dummies are included in the Total and Current spending equations. In the four spending 
functions considered, dummies are not included with the exception of the Local Police equation, since 
this responsibility is compulsory for municipalities with a population higher than 20,000. The services 
included in the other five functions are either compulsory for all municipalities or non compulsory for any 
municipality, so dummies are not needed.  
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Second, we briefly describe the social cost factors. This group of variables controls for the 
effect of the harshness of the environment on local costs. Specifically the variables included are 
the share of residents that are immigrants (% immigrants), the share of residents that are 
unemployed (% unemployed) and the share of houses built before 1950 (% old housing). On the 
one hand, the first two variables are a measure of disadvantaged residents (Ladd and Yinger, 
1989). Given that some services, such as health or social services, are mainly provided to this 
group of people, a municipality with more disadvantaged residents will spend more than other 
municipalities in providing the same level of these services. On the other hand, old housing is a 
measure of the age and, thus, of the quality of the infrastructure. Besides, this variable can 
provide information about the percentage of residents that live in deteriorated housing. The 
coefficients of the variables included are expected to affect local public spending positively, 
according to the results obtained in previous analyses (Solé-Ollé, 2001, Solé-Ollé and Bosch, 
2005). 
 
Third, we briefly describe the economic cost factors. To account for input costs, we include a 
wage variable (wage), measured as the ratio between total wages and salaries paid and the 
number of workers. Given that wage data is not available at the municipal level, we have used 
provincial information. We expect a positive impact of wages on costs, since the higher the 
salary in the private sector, the higher the salary should be in the public sector in order to attract 
workers. 
 
The effect of spillovers on local public spending is measured through two dummies. First, a 
dummy that is equal to 1 if the municipality is a central city (central city), defined as provincial 
capitals or municipalities with a population higher than 100,000. Second, a dummy that is equal 
to 1 if the municipality belongs to an urban area (urban area), that is, if the municipality is 
located less than 35 kilometres from a central city. We assume that such municipalities have to 
bear higher costs derived from the greater mobility generated in these areas. Nevertheless, in 
these cases spillovers might increase also as the population surrounding these particular 
municipalities increases (Solé-Ollé and Bosch, 2005; Solé-Ollé, 2006). To account for this 
effect, these two variables are multiplied by the ratio between the population of the rest of the 
urban area and the population of the municipality (central city × surrounding population, and 
urban area × surrounding population). Additionally, we include a further two variables that 
account for those non-residents that can be considered potential users of local public services: 
the share of second homes in each municipality (% second homes) and the number of tourists 
per capita (tourists). In line with previous findings, we can expect a positive effect of these 
variables on per capita local spending (Solé-Ollé and Bosch, 2005). 
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Finally, the last group of control variables includes three variables that account for the effect of 
resources on the demand for local public services. The first variable is a measure of per capita 
income (income), whose coefficient (parameter β in equation (9)) is the income elasticity of 
demand. The second variable included is the tax share, defined as the tax bill of the 
representative resident divided by the per capita tax revenues of the municipality. Its coefficient 
refers to the price elasticity (parameter α in equation (9)) 14. The tax bill includes two taxes, the 
property tax and the vehicle tax15, and is computed as follows. On the one hand, we calculate 
the sum of the property tax per urban unit, which is multiplied by the average number of 
residential urban units per capita of the sample. On the other hand, we obtain the sum of the 
vehicle tax per vehicle and we multiply it by the average number of vehicles per capita in the 
sample. Then, we add both and divide them by the per capita tax revenues of the municipality. 
A negative coefficient of the income elasticity of demand and a positive coefficient of the price 
elasticity are expected. 
 
Finally, in order to account for the transfers received by each municipality we include two per 
capita variables: Current transfers and Capital transfers. Both variables, according to the 
specification in equation (9), are divided by income and multiplied by the tax share. Transfers 
received by municipalities from upper tiers of government are expected to influence local 
spending positively. 
 
3.3 Results 
 
The per capita local public spending function, specified in equation (9), is estimated using the 
ordinary least squares approach. The results of per capita current spending are shown in Table 
2. We performed four estimations using the same model (equation (9)), the only difference 
being the sprawl variable included each time. Thus, in Column (1) we introduced urbanized 
land per capita. In Column (2) we introduced urbanized land, as well as the other three sprawl 
measures: residential houses, % of scattered population and the number of population centres. 
In order to disaggregate the total effect of the per capita urbanized land in several segments, in 
Column (3) we included as our sprawl measure the piecewise linear function (see section 3.2.a): 
urbanized land_1 (< 75 m2 / pop), urbanized land_2 (75 - 160 m2/ pop), urbanized land_3 (160 
- 700 m2/ pop), and urbanized land_4 (> 700 m2/ pop). Finally, in Column (4), we introduced 
the variables of Column (3) along with the other three sprawl measures. 
                                                     
14 Both income and tax share refer to the representative resident. Given that we are not able to obtain data 
regarding the representative voter, we have used the data for the average voter. 
 
15 Note that the business tax has not been included in the tax bill on the grounds that the average voter is 
not likely to be a business owner. 
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The econometric specification implemented enables us to identify the specific impact of sprawl 
on spending, since we are able to isolate the effects of other municipal characteristics by 
introducing a set of control variables. In other words, we are now in a position to compare 
municipalities with the same characteristics in order to see if those with higher levels of sprawl 
have to bear higher local service provision costs. Our results indicate that urbanized land has a 
Table 2. Effects of urban sprawl on local current spending in Spain. 
Cross-section for the year 2003.  Sample of 2,500 municipalities  (1) 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(i) Urban development patterns 
Urbanized land  0.0578 (6.12)***  0.0625 (6.67)*** -- -- 
Piecewise linear function:     
    Urbanized land_1  (< 75) -- -- 0.0896 (2.45) **   0.1456 (4.00) *** 
    Urbanized land_2  (75 - 160) -- -- 0.0904 (3.42) ***  0.0738 (2.85) *** 
    Urbanized land_3  (160 - 700) -- -- 0.0182 (0.99)   0.0311 (1.71) * 
    Urbanized land_4  (>7 00) -- -- 0.1402 (3.37) ***  0.1281 (3.15) *** 
Residential houses  --  0.0878 (3.52)*** --  0.0879 (3.46) *** 
% Scattered population --  0.0032 (1.34) --  0.0027 (1.12)  
Population centres  -- -0.0554 (-10.62)*** -- -0.0551 (-10.51) *** 
(ii) Demographic, social and economic cost factors 
Population   0.0187 (1.57)   0.0014 (0.12)   0.0186 (1.54)  -0.0002 (-0.02) 
Responsibilities_1 (5,000 - 20,000)  0.0716 (3.78) ***  0.0685 (3.66) ***  0.0721 (3.79) ***  0.0672 (3.59) *** 
Responsibilities _2 (20,000 - 50,000)  0.0829 (2.60) ***  0.0603 (1.93) **  0.0831 (2.61) ***  0.0583 (1.88) * 
Responsibilities _3  (> 50,000)  0.1071 (2.28) **  0.0491 (1.06)  01112 (2.38) **  0.0514 (1.12) 
% Population (< 5)  0.2125 (6.80) ***  0.1251 (3.91) ***  0.2049 (6.55) ***  0.1187 (3.70) *** 
% Population (5-19)  0.0900 (1.64)  -0.0035 (-0.06)  0.0882 (1.58)   -0.0084 (-0.15) 
% Population (> 65)  0.0158 (0.45)  -0.0686 (-1.90) *   0.0081 (0.23)  -0.0774 (-2.12) **  
% Without studies  0.0062 (0.58)  0.0036 (0.35)  0.0034 (0.32)  0.0015 (0.14) 
% Graduates  0.0421 (2.62) ***  0.0308 (2.00) **  0.0405 (2.51) **  0.0282 (1.82) * 
% Unemployed  0.0003 (0.02) -0.0096 (-0.73)  0.0001 (0.01) -0.0090 (-0.69) 
% Immigrants  0.0253 (3.73) ***  0.0239 (3.69) ***  0.0242 (3.60) ***  0.0231 (3.59) *** 
% Old houses  -0.0041 (-0.50)  0.0077 (0.94) -0.0040 (-0.48)  0.0081 (0.97) 
% Second houses  0.0135 (2.72) ***  0.012 3 (2.44) **  0.0138 (2.75) ***  0.0125 (2.45) ** 
Tourists  0.0037 (3.07) ***  0.0048  (4.02 ) ***  0.0036 (3.00) ***  0.0047 (3.92) *** 
Wage   0.1498 (2.33) **  0.1242 (1.93) *  0.1598 (2.45) **  0.1395 (2.16) ** 
Central city -0.0057 (-0.43)  0.0020 (0.18) -0.0041 (-0.29)  0.0036 (0.29) 
Urban area  0.00001 (0.48)  0.00003 (1.26)  0.00001 (0.64)  0.00004 (1.37) 
(iii) Fiscal capacity indicators 
Income  0.7455 (14.18) ***  0.6833 (13.34) ***  0.7516 (14.37) ***  0.6907 (13.53) *** 
Tax share -0.4581 (-18.49) *** -0.4486 (-16.80) *** -0.4650 (-18.39) *** -0.4545 (-16.71) *** 
Current transfers  0.1570 (18.27) ***  0.1588 (18.31) ***  0.1578 (18.23) ***  0.1600 (18.27) *** 
Capital transfers  0.0238 (4.60) ***  0.0225 (4.44) ***  0.0237 (4.60) ***  0.0224 (4.42) *** 
          
R2  0.5351  0.5616  0.5370  0.5633 
F statistic (zero slopes)  114.63 ***  111.17 ***  101.90  ***  100.06 *** 
          
Notes: Ordinary least squares results. t statistics are shown in brackets. * Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level; 
** Significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level; *** Significantly different from zero at the 99 percent level. 
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positive and significant impact on local costs - when included in the model by itself (Column 1) 
and also when interacting with the other three sprawl measures (Column 2) - with a coefficient 
around 0.06. Given that the variables are expressed in logarithms, the estimated parameters can 
be interpreted as the price elasticity. Then, a 1% increase in urbanized land increases local 
public spending by around 0.06%. However, given that the price elasticity is lower than one, the 
impact of sprawl on costs is greater than the impact on spending. That is, the increase in 
provision costs is greater than the increase in the level of public services provided. So, once the 
coefficient has been identified16, a 1% increase in urbanized land increases local public 
spending by around 0.11%. From Columns (2) and (4) we can observe that the estimated 
coefficients of residential houses are positive, significant and of a very similar magnitude. So, if 
we compare two municipalities with the same characteristics and the same per capita urbanized 
land, the one presenting the more scattered distribution of housing will have to bear higher local 
service provision costs. However, the number of population centres has a negative and 
significant impact on local costs, showing that the higher the number of population centres, the 
lower public spending will be. The results obtained for this variable can be understood as 
follows. In a municipality with several population centres (for instance the main population 
centre and a number of housing developments) the local government will not respond to their 
demands equally. Quite the opposite, in those population centres mainly comprising second 
homes, the local authority will provide as few public services as possible, leading to a reduction 
in public spending. This occurs as second-home owners are usually non residents who are, 
therefore, unable to use their voting rights to control the mayor’s performance in that 
jurisdiction17. Finally, the % of scattered population coefficient is positive but not statistically 
significant. 
 
As can be seen in Column (3), when urbanized land is divided in four segments18 (piecewise 
linear function), all the segments with the exception of the third are statistically significant, 
albeit that the coefficients present different magnitudes. The coefficients of the first, second and 
fourth segments are positive and significant, with the slope (and, therefore, the marginal impact 
on local costs) of the fourth being higher than those of the other two. Thus, we can infer that in 
a municipality where urbanized land ranges between 75 and 160 m2/pop (median urban sprawl), 
a 1% increase in this variable leads to a 0.17% increase in costs, while this impact increases up 
                                                     
16 As discussed in section 3.1, although the parameters cannot be interpreted as their direct effect on costs, 
the log-linear specification allows us to identify them simply by dividing by (α+1). 
 
17 Typically politicians seek to maximize the number of votes they obtain by satisfying their residents’ 
preferences. In this context, a politician would have no incentive to respond to the public service demands 
of non residents. 
 
18 See Figure 4 for a graphical analysis. 
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to 0.26% when urbanized land is higher than 700 m2/pop (high urban sprawl). The estimation 
results in Column (4) show that when the main urban variable interacts with the other three 
measures of sprawl, the four coefficients of the piecewise linear function become positive and 
significant. The greater impact of per capita urbanized land on costs occurs in both at the 
highest and lowest population densities (first and last segment, respectively). That is, this 
variable has a notable impact on costs in compact municipalities, as well as in those 
municipalities that have already undergone considerable urban sprawl and which continue to 
spread out. Finally, the magnitude and sign of the other three sprawl measures are the same as in 
Column (2). 
 
If we now consider the control variables of the model, we see first of all that the price elasticity, 
identified as the estimated coefficient of the tax share, is around -0.45, and that the income 
elasticity of demand, identified as the coefficient of per capita Income, takes a value of 0.75. 
The magnitude and sign of both coefficients are in accordance with previously published results 
in the literature. Second, the estimated coefficient of transfers is positive and significant, and 
can be interpreted as follows. An additional euro of current transfers leads to an increase in 
spending fifteen times higher than that produced by one euro of income, or twice as much in the 
case of capital transfers, suggesting a strong ‘flypaper effect’ (se also Solé-Ollé, 2001) Third, as 
expected, the responsibilities coefficients are positive and significant, unlike the population 
coefficient, which is positive but not statistically significant. A higher level of responsibilities 
associated with a larger population leads to an increase in the provision costs of local public 
services. The share of population younger than five (% population < 5), the share of graduate 
population (% graduated), as well as the share of residents that are immigrants (% immigrants) 
have a positive impact on local spending, as indicated by their positive and significant 
coefficients. The elderly (% population >65) present a negative and significant coefficient in 
two of the four specifications. Unemployed residents (% unemployed) and those without studies 
(% without studies), and the share of old housing (% old housing) do not have a statistically 
significant effect on current spending. The two variables that account for spillover effects, 
central city and urban area, do not have a statistically significant effect, either. According to the 
coefficients of the % of second houses and the number of Tourists, the non-residents considered 
as potential users have a positive impact on local costs. Finally, wages, in line with the theory, 
lead to greater costs.  
 
Therefore, the sign and the magnitude of estimated coefficients, as well as the explanatory 
capacity of the model (around 55%), are consistent with the results obtained in previous 
analyses of the determinants of local public spending in the Spanish case (Solé-Ollé, 2001; 
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Solé-Ollé and Bosch, 2005). These findings allow us to validate the empirical model used here, 
giving us confidence in the robustness of the results we obtained for the urban sprawl variables. 
 
In Table 3 we show the estimation results of the urban sprawl variables for Total spending and 
the six expenditure functions19. In general, the results obtained for Total spending are analogous 
to those for Current spending (which have been explained above). We should stress, however, 
that here the % of scattered population coefficient is positive and significant. Besides, the 
estimation results for the control variables are very similar in all cases (that is, for total and 
current spending, and the five spending functions), with the exception of the Basic 
infrastructures and transportation function.  
 
If we now consider the sprawl variables of the six spending functions, we can see in Columns 
(1) and (2) that the coefficient of urbanized land is positive and significant for all functions 
apart from Housing and community development, where it is not statistically significant. On the 
basis of these results, we can infer that urban development patterns have a different impact on 
local costs, depending on the type of public service under consideration. Thus, after 
identification, a 1% increase in urbanized land increases Basic infrastructure and 
transportation costs by 0.28%, Community facilities costs by 0.11%, Local police costs by 
0.10%, Housing and community development costs by 0.08%, Culture and sports costs by 
0.17% and General administration costs by 0.12%. This provides evidence of the additional 
local costs generated by the extension of roads to new housing developments. The same is true 
of police protection, trash collection and street cleaning services, among others. A greater 
degree of population dispersion undermines the use of scale economies, leading to increased 
costs.  
 
Our estimation results for the other three sprawl measures are shown in Columns (2) and (4). 
The coefficient of residential housing is positive and statistically significant only in the case of 
two expenditure functions: Housing and community development and Local police. The number 
of population centres has a negative effect in all the expenditure functions apart from Basic 
infrastructures and transportation, where it is positive. This might indicate that the extension of 
roads and other infrastructure to new housing developments has a positive impact on costs, 
since they represent a great investment when providing a service to a relatively small number of 
residents. It is also important to highlight the positive and significant coefficient of the % of 
scattered population in two expenditure functions: Community facilities and Local police. In 
other words, municipalities with a more scattered population have to deal with higher costs as 
                                                     
19 Estimation results for the control variables of the model are not included in this paper. However, they 
can be requested from the authors by email. 
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regards police protection and local services such as street cleaning, trash collection and water 
supply. 
 
The piecewise linear coefficients, shown in Columns (2) and (4), are very similar for the various 
spending functions but differ slightly from those obtained in the total and current spending 
specifications. Thus, we can infer that the functional form of urbanized land has also changed 
slightly (see Figure 4). Specifically, in all the spending functions, apart from Basic 
infrastructures and transportation and General administration, the segment that now remains 
statistically significant is the last one (> 700 m2 / pop). Therefore, the impact of a lower 
population density on these four spending functions increases in the municipalities presenting 
the highest levels of urban sprawl in contrast to those with the lowest levels. In such cases, the 
effect of an additional 1% of per capita urbanized land increases costs by between 0.33 and 
0.85%. The expenditure function in Culture and Sports also presents a positive and significant 
coefficient in the second segment. The results for Basic infrastructures and transportation and 
General administration show that the only segment with a significant coefficient is the third 
(160 - 700 m2 / pop). Thus, at this level of urban sprawl the increase in costs (0.06%) is mainly 
due to road construction (0.04%) and administration (0.017%) costs. Besides, these results 
might indicate that increases in per capita current spending in the first segment (per capita 
urbanized land lower than 75 m2/pop) are due to services other than those included in the 
functions already analysed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23
Table 3. Effects of urban sprawl on total spending and six expenditure functions 
in Spain. Cross-section for the year 2003. Sample of 2,500 municipalities. (1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(i) Total spending 
Urbanized land  0.0564 (5.49) ***  0.0617 (6.00) *** -- -- 
Piecewise linear function:     
    Urbanized land_1  (< 75) -- --  0.0815 (1.86) *  0.1207 (2.66) ***  
    Urbanized land_2  (75 - 160) -- --  0.0875 (3.04) ***  0.0788 (2.76)*** 
    Urbanized land_3  (160 - 700) -- --  0.0150 (0.76)  0.0268 (1.35) 
    Urbanized land_4  (>7 00) -- --  0.1495 (3.02) ***  0.1393 (2.91) *** 
Residential houses  --  0.0457 (1.56)  --  0.0459 (1.53)  
% Scattered population --  0.0058 (2.19) ** --  0.0054 (2.02) ** 
Population centres  -- -0.0485 (-8.73) *** -- -0.0480 (-8.62) ***
(ii ) Community facilities 
Urbanized land  0.0643 (2.59) ***  0.0669 (2.67) *** -- -- 
Piecewise linear function:     
    Urbanized land_1  (< 75) -- --  0.1182 (1.28)  0.1030 (0.69) 
    Urbanized land_2  (75 - 160) -- -- -0.0742 (-0.91)  -0.0597 (-0.73) 
    Urbanized land_3  (160 - 700) -- --  0.0537 (1.06)   0.0581 (1.14)  
    Urbanized land_4  (>7 00) -- --  0.2866 (3.17) ***  0.2696 (3.02) *** 
Residential houses  --  0.0533 (0.97)  --  0.0531 (0.96)  
% Scattered population --  0.0209 (2.75) *** --  0.0193 (2.52) ** 
Population centres  -- -0.0372 (-2.23) **  -- -0.0353 (-2.11) ** 
(iii) Basic infrastructures and transport 
Urbanized land  0.1234 (2.73) ***  0.1228 (2.67) *** -- -- 
Piecewise linear function:     
    Urbanized land_1  (< 75) -- --  0.3472 (1.50)  0.2549 (1.08) 
    Urbanized land_2  (75 - 160) -- -- -0.2503 (-1.60) -0.2187 (-1.40)  
    Urbanized land_3  (160 - 700) -- --  0.2337 (2.64) ***  0.2223 (2.51) ** 
    Urbanized land_4  (>7 00) -- --  0.1888 (0.94)  0.2154 (1.05) 
Residential houses  -- -0.2094 (-2.73) ** -- -0.2118 (-2.75) ***
% Scattered population --  0.0115 (0.89)  --  0.0094 (0.94)  
Population centres  --  0.0542 (1.95) ** --  0.0532 (1.92) * 
(iv) Housing and community development 
Urbanized land  0.0339 (1.24)  0.0388 (1.41) -- -- 
Piecewise linear function:     
    Urbanized land_1  (< 75) -- -- -0.1201 (-0.76) -0.0562 (-0.35) 
    Urbanized land_2  (75 - 160) -- --  0.1058 (1.11)   0.0925 (0.97)  
    Urbanized land_3  (160 - 700) -- -- -0.0816 (-1.45)   -0.0690 (-1.22) 
    Urbanized land_4  (>7 00) -- --  0.4103 (4.61) ***  0.3880 (4.36) *** 
Residential houses  --  0.1618 (2.44) ** --  0.1616 (2.40) ** 
% Scattered population --  0.0053 (0.63) --  0.0053 (0.62) 
Population centres  -- -0.0694 (-3.99) *** -- -0.0651 (-3.73) ***
     
 
 
 
 
 
24
Table 3. (continued) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(v) Local police 
Urbanized land  0 .0841 (2.28) **  0.0913 (2.47) ** -- -- 
Piecewise linear function:     
    Urbanized land_1  (< 75) -- --  0.0548 (0.36)  0.1367 (0.83) 
    Urbanized land_2  (75 - 160) -- --  0.0317 (0.27)   0.0483 (0.42)  
    Urbanized land_3  (160 - 700) -- --  0.0432 (0.53)   0.0512 (0.64)  
    Urbanized land_4  (>7 00) -- --  0.3591 (2.21) **  0.3079 (1.93) * 
Residential houses  --  0.3582 (3.10) *** --  0.3568 (3.07) *** 
% Scattered population --  0.0291 (2.66) *** --  0.0282 (2.55) ** 
Population centres  -- -0.1428 (-6.06) *** -- -0.1414 (-5.95) *** 
(vi) General administration 
Urbanized land  0.0629 (3.43) ***  0.0724 (3.92) *** -- -- 
Piecewise linear function:     
    Urbanized land_1  (< 75) -- --  0.0392 (0.35)  0.1149 (1.02) 
    Urbanized land_2  (75 - 160) -- --  0.0537 (0.82)   0.0390 (0.60)  
    Urbanized land_3  (160 - 700) -- --  0.0725 (2.09) **  0.0912 (2.61) *** 
    Urbanized land_4  (>7 00) -- --  0.0501 (0.70)  0.0395 (0.55) 
Residential houses  --  0.0012 (0.03) -- -0.0015 (-0.04)  
% Scattered population --  0.0001 (0.02) --  0.0016 (0.03) 
Population centres  -- -0.0596 (-5.02) *** -- -0.0603 (-5.02) *** 
(vii) Culture and sports 
Urbanized land  0 .0671 (3.18) ***  0.0793 (3.72) *** -- -- 
Piecewise linear function:     
    Urbanized land_1  (< 75) -- -- -0.0142 (-0.14)  0.0932 (0.84) 
    Urbanized land_2  (75 - 160) -- --  0.2991 (4.32) ***   0.2798 (4.03) ***  
    Urbanized land_3  (160 - 700) -- --  -0.0496 (-1.19)  -0.0264 (-0.62)  
    Urbanized land_4  (>7 00) -- --  0.1879 (2.28) **  0.1712 (2.11) ** 
Residential houses  --  0.0499 (0.73) --  0.0521 (0.75) 
% Scattered population --  -0.0015 (-0.23) -- -0.0007 (-0.12) 
Population centres  -- -0.0807 (-6.04) *** -- -0.0794 (-5.93) *** 
     
Notes: Ordinary least squares results. t statistics are shown in brackets. * Significantly different from zero at the 90 
percent level; ** Significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level; *** Significantly different from zero at 
the 99 percent level. 
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Figure 4. 
Piecewise linear function. Comparison between current  
spending and six disaggregated measures of public spending 
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Overall we can establish that these six expenditure functions account for about 81% of the total 
increase in costs due to urban sprawl20. In particular, a 1% increase in urbanized land raises 
costs by 0.11%. Twelve per cent of this increase (0.013%) is due to an increase in Community 
facilities costs, 21% to an increase in Basic infrastructures and transportation (0.023%), 13% to 
an increase in Housing and community development (0.014%), 6% to an increase in Local 
police (0.007%), 17% to an increase in Culture and sports (0.019%) and 12% to an increase in 
General administration (0.014%). In addition, the analysis of the third and last segments of the 
piecewise linear function shows that at this level of urban sprawl approximately all the increase 
in costs (due to urban sprawl) is attributable to the cost increases in the local services considered 
in this study. 
 
Finally, we can employ this estimated impact of sprawl on local costs to simulate the situation 
in Spain over recent years e.g., the period 1995-2005. As shown in section 3.1, per capita costs 
depend on the level of outcome, a group of environmental cost factors and urban sprawl (see 
equation (3)). Assuming that both the quality of public services (q) and the environmental costs 
factors (z) have remained almost constant over this period, we can compute the increase in local 
costs that is basically attributable to urban sprawl (f(d)) starting from the following expression: 
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20 This percentage has been computed from the coefficients, after identification, in Column (1) of Tables 
2 and 3. 
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Where i indicates municipality, t year, and N is the number of municipalities. Hence, we can 
simulate the average increase in costs due to the impact of sprawl between 1995 and 2005 for 
each spending category (Cj) by computing the following ratio: 
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where 1ˆˆ +jj αβ  is the estimated coefficient of urbanized land once correctly identified (obtained 
from Tables 2 and 3), i denotes the municipality, j denotes the expenditure category and N the 
sample size21. Our results indicate that between 1995 and 2005 per capita local costs have 
increased on average by 2.3% due to the impact of urban sprawl. In particular, sprawl has 
increased community facility costs by 2.3%, infrastructure costs by 7%, housing and local 
police costs by 2%, administrative costs by 2.7% and culture costs by 3.7%. However, there 
exists a high degree of dispersion among the sample, given that the increase in costs ranges 
from 1% up to 80%. More specifically, in 4% of the municipalities analysed the impact on costs 
is above 10%.  The municipalities in which urban sprawl has had the most marked impact on 
budget levels are mainly those that presented a per capita urbanized land below the average 
level for 1995 and which faced a higher growth rate in terms of the amount of land developed in 
the period under analysis. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Urban development patterns have undergone notable changes in Spain in recent  years with the 
adoption of the spatially expansive and scattered urban growth model of urban sprawl. One of 
the main consequences of this phenomenon is widely thought to be the increasing costs of 
providing local public services. 
 
Given that previous empirical analyses designed to test this hypothesis are scarce –and where 
they do exist they focus primarily on the U.S. case–, we believe that this study of the situation in 
Spain can make a significant contribution to the existing literature. Here, we have examined the 
influence of urban sprawl on total and current spending, as well as on the six measures of 
                                                     
21 Note that for this simulation exercise we have used a much larger sample than before, given that the 
only variable required, urbanized land, is available for 7,300 of the existing 8,100 municipalities. 
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spending which we consider likely to be most affected by urban sprawl (Community facilities, 
Basic infrastructures and transportation, Housing and community development, Local police, 
Culture and sports, and General administration). In so doing, we have estimated eight 
expenditure equations with the data from 2,500 municipalities for the year 2003. Urban 
development patterns were first measured in terms of urbanized land, i.e., a measure of the 
amount of per capita built-up area within each municipality. We should stress that our data 
were available at the local level, that is at the very level where political decisions concerning the 
public services analysed here are taken. In order to account for the potentially nonlinear 
relationship between this variable and local costs, we assumed a piecewise linear function. In 
addition to this measure, three other variables were included in the model in an attempt at 
providing a more accurate measurement of the scale of urban sprawl: residential houses, % of 
scattered population, population centres. Finally, we included a group of control variables so as 
to distinguish the effects of urban sprawl on local costs from those of other cost and demand 
factors. In this way, once we had controlled for a set of municipal characteristics, we were then 
able to determine the specific impact of sprawl on costs. Our estimation results for the control 
variables proved to be very similar to those obtained in previous analyses, indicating the 
robustness of our empirical model and, more specifically, of our urban sprawl results. 
 
In general, our estimation results indicate that low-density developments led to greater provision 
costs in all the spending categories considered, with the exception of Housing. By adopting the 
piecewise linear function assumption we were able to disaggregate this total effect, revealing 
that the impact on total costs accelerated at very low and very high levels of sprawl, i.e., in those 
locations where per capita urbanized land was less than 75 (compact pattern) or greater than 
700 m2/pop (urban sprawl pattern). Further, the impact of urban sprawl on the provision costs of 
the public services considered here was particularly marked at high levels of sprawl (per capita 
urbanized land between 160 and 700, and greater than 700 m2/pop). These results suggest that in 
municipalities with a spatially expansive urban development pattern, the provision costs of 
public services increase initially as a result of increasing road construction costs and rising 
general administration costs, and then, if the urban sprawl advances further, costs continue to 
rise as a result of higher costs in providing community facilities, housing, local police and 
culture. In those municipalities with very low levels of urban sprawl (<75 m2 / pop), the increase 
in local costs was due to public services other than those analysed here. The other three 
measures of sprawl serve to reinforce our results. The % of scattered population coefficient was 
positive and significant in Total Spending, Community facilities and Local police, and the 
residential houses coefficient in Housing and community development and Local police. 
Population centres had a negative impact on costs, except in the case of Basic infrastructures 
and transportation, where it was positive. This negative sign might indicate that local 
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governments tend to pay scant regard to the public service demands emanating from the housing 
developments of non residents, given that they are unable to exert any political control over the 
mayor. Moreover, the simulation carried out for the period 1995-2005 showed the average 
increase in local costs attributable to urban sprawl to be quite low (around 2.3%) and, therefore, 
easily met by the local governments. However, in those municipalities where the amount of 
urbanized land was below the 1995 average but where urban sprawl was considerable during the 
period, the increase in costs was markedly higher (above 10%).  
 
Thus, in this paper we have provided evidence of the nonlinear impact of urban sprawl on the 
costs of providing local public services. Further, more spatially expansive urban development 
patterns undermine the use of scale economies in the provision of certain public services, such 
as trash collection, street cleaning and public transport. The extension of basic infrastructures 
over longer distances to reach a relatively small number of residents leads to an inefficient 
increase in local costs. This increase should not perhaps be seen as a problem since it results 
from the specific new urban development pattern desired by the residents. In this sense, the 
fulfilment of their preferences might justify the higher rates of taxation needed to subsidise 
these increased costs. However, problems arise when new developers fail to internalise the full 
costs that they generate, leaving the local government to pay for them (i.e., the municipal 
authorities raise the taxes of all residents in the jurisdiction and ask for higher transfers from the 
upper tiers of government).  
 
Finally, we should emphasise that this study simply provides evidence of the existence of higher 
provision costs of several local services due to urban sprawl. Hence, further research into the 
impact of sprawl on local revenues is needed so as to determine more accurately the net fiscal 
impact of this phenomenon on municipal budgets. 
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